This paper investigates whether the efficiency effect of product market dispersion is a function of the infrastructural and policy environment. We hypothesize that more developed transportation and communication infrastructure and lower government regulation may reduce transaction costs, intensifying the competition associated with a given market structure, and we use data from the recently liberalized and regionally diverse country of Russia to test the hypothesis. Estimating translog production functions on a large 1992-99 panel of manufacturing firms, we find that the efficiency impact of market dispersion varies positively with the regional density of highway, railroad and telephone infrastructure, but negatively with regional price regulation and the share of votes received by the Communist Party. JEL classification numbers: H54, L1, L5, L91, P23, P31.
Introduction
The proposition that competition in product markets stimulates firms to improve efficiency has long been an article of faith for many economists, and recent research has provided some empirical support (e.g., Nickell, 1996; Hay and Liu, 1997; Berger and Hannan, 1998) . But what policies are necessary to make competition work? Is it sufficient to rely on anti-trust policies to prevent concentration and keep industrial structure dispersed? Two potential problems are that poor infrastructure may raise transaction costs, making it unprofitable for firms to sell outside their immediate vicinity, and regulatory policies such as price controls can hinder firms from competing with one another. In such cases competition may be weak even if measures of industrial concentration are low. Thus, infrastructure investment and deregulation may be essential policy tools for expanding markets and promoting competition. This paper addresses the competition-enhancing effect of infrastructure and policies in the context of an economy that has undergone drastic reform during the 1990s: Russia. We use firm-level panel data for nearly the entire manufacturing sector over the years 1992-99, covering a significant time period after the "big bang" liberalization of January 1992. Our procedure is to estimate the effects of proxies for infrastructural development and economic policies on firm productivity, interacting each variable with a measure of product market structure in order to ascertain the degree to which the impact of market dispersion on productivity varies with these factors. Our set of infrastructural variables includes measures of regional highway, railroad, and telephone density, plus an overall index of transportation infrastructure, and our set of policy variables includes the regional extent of price controls and share of votes received by the Communist Party, the latter proxying for the "Red Belt" policies of business intervention and protectionism.
1 Our choice of Russia as a useful case for studying these issues is motivated not only by the sudden, largely unexpected nature of the reforms, which permits us to treat prior market structure as exogeneous and thereby to avoid the potential simultaneity bias in more developed market economies, but also by the large regional variation in the infrastructural and policy environment in Russia.
The research reported in this paper is related to several diverse literatures.
First, the paper may contribute towards understanding the puzzle of why empirical studies of the efficiency effects of competition have produced evidence that is "not overwhelming," as Nickell (1996) expressed it. While some recent studies, such as those cited above, do report significant positive effects, others, including Nickell, Wadhwani and Wall (1992) and Blanchflower and Machin (1996) , do not. The discrepancy in findings may be partly attributable to measurement and estimation difficulties, including the problems of capturing the scope of markets and the effectiveness of competition. But an additional possible explanation is that the impact of market dispersion on firm performance is contingent upon other factors, including other elements of the environment that encourage or inhibit competitive behavior.
Thus, the effect of market structure is not homogeneous across settings in which these factors vary. In this paper we emphasize complementary infrastructure and policies, factors that we believe may alter the conditions under which a given market structure creates incentives for competition.
Our analysis follows the argument of Schankerman (1999, 2000) that infrastructural investments may have not only conventional benefits arising from direct cost reductions to consumers and producers, but also indirect benefits through reducing transaction costs and thereby facilitating competition. In their analysis, infrastructure investments are modelled as increasing competition by increasing the substitutability of differentiated goods. The increased competition has positive externalities that may justify public expenditures. Unlike Aghion and Schankerman, who consider in addition the entry and exit implications, however, we focus on the efficiency effects of enhanced competition only on incumbent firms, and while their analysis is purely theoretical, our contribution is empirical: an econometric estimation of the extent to which competition is intensified by improved infrastructure or policies.
Other empirical studies have documented a robust relationship between infrastructure development and economic performance, although the unit of analysis has usually been at the level of the country, region or industry, rather than the firm (e.g., Norton, 1992; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Demetriades and Mamuneas, 2000; Demurger, 2001) . Moreover, the precise mechanism through which infrastructure affects productivity has not been examined. Our work at the firm level provides some microeconomic foundation for a particular mechanism: the enhanced competition enabled by improved infrastructural and policy environment.
Finally, our research is also related to theoretical work on complementarities of policies in the process of reform (e.g., Gates, Milgrom, and Roberts, 1996; Friedman and Johnson, 1996; Aghion, Dewatripont, and Rey, 1997) . Our focus here includes complementarities of policies as well as infrastructure that may be linked to improving competition. As yet there has been little empirical evidence on the importance of either.
2 2 Relatedly, Nickell, Nicolitas, and Dryden (1997) examine the interaction of rents (measuring market concentration) and a dummy for a dominant shareholder (measuring corporate governance) in UK data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our econometric framework, while Section 3 describes our data and the particular measures of competition and of infrastructure and policies that we employ in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our estimation results, and Section 5 concludes.
Definitions of variables are provided in the Appendix.
Econometric Framework
Our chief hypothesis in this paper is that the impact of measured market structure on firm performance is a function of certain aspects of the economic environment, including infrastructural development and other economic policies, that affect transaction costs. Our data and approach to measuring market dispersion (the inverse of concentration), for now denoted Disp, and infrastructure and policies, for now denoted Inf (a vector), are discussed in the next section. In this section, we present our specifications of the equations we estimate.
A first issue is the definition of firm performance. We follow Nickell (1996) and others in focussing on total factor productivity (TFP) in a panel data framework, thus our basic estimating equation involves an augmented production function as follows:
where log refers to the natural logarithm, Y is output (no information on value-added, material inputs or other factors is available), K is stock of plant and equipment, L 1 is number of production workers, L 2 is nonproduction workers, i indexes firms, t indexes time periods (years, in our case), X is a vector of control variables, and the α and β are parameters to be estimated. The parameter of central interest in this paper is β 2 , 5 which captures the variation of the effect of Disp on TFP. Adopting a translog form for the production function f implies the following: where the γ are parameters to be estimated.
Several econometric problems arise in the estimation. One is the possibility that E(Disp i u i ) ≠ 0 due to the endogeneity problems of market structure with respect to firm performance (according, for instance, to the "efficient market structure" view of Demsetz, 1973, and Peltzman, 1977) . To handle this problem, we exploit the fact that market structure in Russia during the socialist period was determined by central planners' decisions concerning the allocation of resources rather than by the market.
We employ a measure of market structure based on the last year prior to the beginning of partial reforms, 1987; our dispersion measure, Disp 87 , is described in detail in the next section.
Another econometric problem is that the sample may be nonrandom due to systematic patterns of exit and survival; such selection effects may be especially powerful when the competitive shock is very large. If the failure rate of firms is correlated with performance and the size of the shock, then this would imply E(u it ) ≠ 0 and induce a bias in the estimate of β 2 . To address this issue, we estimate a survival probability function
where Φ is the normal distribution function, the δ are parameters to be estimated,
Subsidiary93 i indicates whether the firm is in a subsidiary relationship in 1993 and
Plants93 i measures the number of plants in 1993. These additional variables are included in the survival equation, as they may affect the probability that a firm disappears from our sample (because they affect the costs of reorganizations such as shutting down plants or subsidiaries of a parent company), but they are excluded from the performance equation.
To take into account heterogeneity in the production function (beyond the general form permitted by the translog specification), we allow the γ to vary across 10 sectors. As the factors of production may be endogenous, we instrument them using their 1992 values.
Next we turn to control variables, the X it . Ownership is a natural candidate, insofar as the state was the dominant owner for decades while the privatization program produced a quite heterogeneous ownership and corporate governance structure by 1994. If this heterogeneity is correlated with market structure (for instance, because more competitive sectors were more likely to be privatized), then estimates of β 0 and β 2 may be biased. Of course, ownership may suffer from endogeneity problems as well; because our ownership measures consist of a set of dummy variables by ownership type, we take the possible endogeneity into account using a selection bias correction. We first estimate a selection probit for Nonstate, a dummy for firms with at least some non-state ownership, and then add the resulting inverse Mill's ratios to the production function estimation. 3 The exclusion restrictions include the number of non-state firms in firm i's former Soviet branch ministry and region as a proportion of the total number of firms (not including firm i).
Other factors affecting TFP include initial conditions and the magnitude of the demand shock faced by the firm, as the state cut its orders drastically and customer and supply chains broke down (Blanchard and Kremer, 1997 and its profitability in 1992 (Profit 92 ). We include year effects, the growth in real industry and regional output indices (IndustryGrowth and RegionalGrowth) and industry producer price inflation (PriceChange) under the assumption that these represent exogenous factors that may be correlated with unobserved shocks to a firm's productivity and possibly with competition as well. We hypothesize that firms facing a greater demand shock will have more difficulty maintaining productive efficiency, due to the costs of laying off workers, unbundling equipment and other capital, etc. A greater price change, though, should give firms more of a cushion, allowing them to delay restructuring, although the estimated effects of these variables may also reflect market conditions in a firm's environment: particularly for declining firms, maintaining TFP may be easier when the industry and region is growing, facilitating the release of workers and capital to other firms. We also include industry group dummies (10 groups) to take into account differences in set-up costs or problems in the measurement of the capital stock, for instance due to some firms inheriting relatively modern equipment, since such variation is likely to be correlated with initial conditions and industry affiliation.
Finally, to control for remaining unobserved heterogeneity, we include random effects in some equations, estimating with GLS. The random effects take into account systematic variation across groups of observations, and we define the groups in two alternative ways: firms and region-industry cells. While the standard specification in firm-level panel data would involve grouping by firm, we also examine the results from the region-industry cell grouping, because our variables of interest (Disp and Inf) vary across these cells. We do not include fixed-effects because several of these variables are constant across time. In our OLS estimations, our estimates of standard errors take into account clustering on firms.
To summarize, our estimating equation is the following: 
Data
The firm panel data in this study are constructed from three sets of sources.
The most important set consists of the Goskomstat (State Committee for Statistics)
Industrial Registries: annual industrial censuses on all Russian industrial enterprises with 100 or more employees and those with fewer than 100 employees that are at least 25 percent owned by other legal entities (including the state or governmental bodies).
The data do not cover industrial enterprises with fewer than 100 employees and more than 75 percent owned by individuals or industrial divisions of non-industrial enterprises (representing 9.5 percent of industrial employment in 1992). Similarly to industrial surveys and censuses in the U.S., only a small number of variables are collected, but they are sufficient to permit us to measure market structure quite precisely along a number of dimensions (as described below) and to estimate threefactor production functions. We have obtained files for these registries for each of the years from 1993 to 1999, but as each file contains previous year information for most of the variables, we are able to make use of the year 1992 data as well, although we do not observe enterprises that exited between 1992 and 1993. We constructed a panel by matching enterprise identification codes across the supplemented registry files. Each registry contains 3,000-4,000 IDs not in previous registries, and a similar number of IDs drop out of each subsequent registry. Some of this is due to genuine firm entry and exit, some to non-reporting enterprises, and some to re-registrations of firms under new IDs. For all the IDs not having data in every registry, we searched in all the other registries for matching enterprises by using names, addresses, industries, employment, and output values. By so doing, we were able to link 1,094 enterprises in 1993 whose IDs appear to have changed in a later year, 708 in 1994, 606 in 1995, 203 in 1996, 78 in 1997, and 60 in 1998 . Since the registries contain previous year as well as current year values, we were able to fill in entire years of data for several thousand enterprises that existed in a particular year, but for some reason did not report. Table 1 shows the construction of the sample for the regression analysis. Here we include subsidiaries wherever possible and exclude redundant consolidated firms (that is, firms for which we are able to include subsidiaries); the total is shown in the first row of this part. From this total in each year, we excluded firms classified as public organizations (non-profit firms and those belonging to the ministry of culture, the environment, health, or the interior -the database contains a number of prisons).
We have also excluded enterprises that have fewer than 100 employees in 1993, because the database includes only firms in this category with at least 25 percent ownership by a legal entity, which skews the sample. Finally, missing data are a significant problem in the database, creating a final restriction on firms included in our sample for regression analysis. The most important restriction stems from the fact that our research question concerns the impact of the competitive shock of 1992, thus requires information for that year and indeed pertains only to firms that existed at that time. New start-up firms, likely to be intrinsically different in many respects from the enterprises inherited from the socialist system, are therefore excluded from our sample, which is in any case necessary since such firms entered only after 1992 or were very small in 1992, so would not be in the 1993 registry.
The regression sample thus restricted contains 1992 to 1999 data for an unbalanced panel of 12,896 industrial enterprises (33 firms provide 1992 information but are missing output in 1993, explaining the difference from the 1993 figure in the bottom row of Table 1 ). This sample covers approximately 91 percent of total manufacturing employment in 1993.
Next, we turn to a discussion of our measures of competitive pressure, which we calculate using a separate database for 1987, in order to avoid simultaneity bias in the relationship of firm performance and market structure, as discussed in the previous section. We draw the 1987 data from the ALBA database, which is a The 1987 data permit us to calculate conventional measures, including the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or any concentration ratio or dispersion index.
We compute HHIs at the most disaggregated level available: the Russian 5-digit industry classification, of which there are 262 separate categories in the data used in the regressions. 4 We calculate the HHIs at two geographic levels: national and regional. The regional level is the subject of the Russian Federation (oblast), of which there are 73 in the regressions). The mean of the non-state dummy indicates that 79.5 percent of the firms were either fully private, mixed state-private, or at least partially foreign-owned.
Two proxies for economic policies of regional governments are used in this paper. PriceReg 96 refers to the proportion of goods under price controls in a region during the first quarter of 1996 (as reported in Lavrov, 1996) ; the mean was .156.
Communist 95 measures the proportion of the vote received by the Communist Party in the parliamentary (Duma) elections in 1995; the mean was .223. Our motivation for this measure draws upon Berkowitz and DeJong's (1999) analysis of "internal borders" in Russia, according to which regional governments dominated by the Communist Party favored "administrative allocation of inputs and credits" and "a return to broad price controls, broad subsidies for goods and services, an increase in state-initiated resource allocation (planning), and a slowdown in the process of privatization." Such regions were also more likely to impose controls on interregional trade, thus limiting the extent to which producers from outside the region could effectively compete with those inside.
Concerning infrastructure, we have four variables: HighwayDensity t denotes the log of the number of kilometers of paved roads per 1,000 square kilometers of area in the firm's region, RailroadDensity t is the analogous variable for railroads (except measured per 10,000 square kilometers), Telephone t is the number of telephones per urban household (more appropriate for industrial firms than the other available variable of telephones per rural household), and Transport is a summary index of the region's transportation infrastructure varying from 0 to 1 based upon a number of indicators, as described in the Appendix. The first three of these variables are taken from the Goskomstat Regional Yearbooks and are available for 1993 through 1997 (also 1998 in the case of Telephone), while the Transport index is available for only a single date and is taken from Matiyasevich et al (1997) . Due to this high collinearity we are not able to distinguish the separate effects of different types and measures of transportation infrastructure, thus these variables are treated as alternative measures in our specifications of equations. We comment further on the implications of multicollinearity in interpreting our results below.
Estimation Results
We begin by presenting the results of specifications where we assume β 2 = 0, in other words dropping the interaction terms (Disp i87 Inf it ), in order to test the average effects of Disp, market dispersion, and Inf, the infrastructure and policy variables, on productive efficiency. The results from estimating under these constraints, and with
HighwayDensity as the infrastructural indicator, appear in Table 3 The results in Table 3 suggest that market dispersion has a positive effect on total factor productivity, but the estimate is statistically significant only in the specification with random effects at the region-industry level. The results concerning other variables are unchanged.
Turning to estimation including interaction terms, Table 5 displays the same   specifications as in Tables 3 and 4 , but without the constraint that the vector of interaction coefficients β 2 =0. In all specifications, price regulation and Communist
Party vote are estimated to decrease the impact of market dispersion on firm efficiency, and the result is usually statistically significant. Highway and railroad infrastructure are always estimated to raise the impact of market dispersion, as is the Transport index, but the effect of telephone density is less consistent in sign and it is only positive and statistically significant in the random effects (grouped by regionindustry) where HighwayDensity and RailroadDensity are the transportation measures, but not when it is Transport. These results may be taken as strong evidence that transportation infrastructure raises the effective competition associated with a given market structure, and they also appear to suggest that communications infrastructure (proxied by Telephone) may be less important in this respect. But the high collinearity of these variables.... Table 6 provides results using the more conventional market dispersion measures NatDisp and RegDisp in place of Disp. The results are similar except that in one specification, using NatDisp and REs based on region-industry groups, PriceReg is estimated to raise the impact of market dispersion.
A final set of robustness checks involves examining the results excluding the two regions that are wholly urban: Moscow and St. Petersburg. These two regions are frequently claimed to be outliers in a number of dimensions of economic development, and it may also be argued that infrastructure measures are less relevant in relatively small urban areas where firms are located in fairly close proximity.
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The results from excluding them, shown in across all specifications for the hypotheses that price regulation and trade restrictions promoted by the Communist Party tend to reduce the efficiency impact of market dispersion, while all types of infrastructure measures -highway, railroad and telephone density, as well as the overall transportation index -tends to raise this impact. By contrast with the estimations that included Moscow and St. Petersburg, the effect of telephone density tends to be more robust.
Conclusion
Despite the wide acceptance of the proposition that competition increases efficiency, the evidence in its favor is, as Nickell (1996) put it, "not overwhelming."
This paper has analyzed one reason why studies of the relationship between measures of market structure and efficiency may have yielded weak or ambiguous results: the role of infrastructure and policies in facilitating competition. In situations where infrastructure is poorly developed and policies inhibit competition, an increase in the dispersion of market structure may have little or no disciplinary effect on firms. For competition to work, therefore, it may be essential that a set of complementary conditions, including physical infrastructure, well-functioning institutions, and conducive policies, be in place.
Our empirical support for this argument draws on the case of Russia, a country which underwent a dramatic liberalization of competition in 1992 and which is also characterized by large regional variation in transportation infrastructure and economic policies. Examining the effects of proxy measures for each of these -highway, railroad, and telephone density, an index of transportation quality, the extent of price controls, and votes for the Communist Party to proxy for the anti-trade policies of the "Red Belt" -we find that the impact of market dispersion on productive efficiency of firms is increased by improved infrastructure and reduced by policies that constrain trade and business decisions. Although there are rather high levels of correlation among the infrastructural variables, the results are robust to alternative specifications of the control variables and random effects, to alternative definitions of market structure and of transportation infrastructure, and to dropping the two wholly urban areas -Moscow and St. Petersburg -from the sample.
The results suggest that a substantial payoff from better policy design and infrastructural development may arise indirectly, through intensifying competition among firms. While anti-trust or competition policy may be necessary to create more dispersed market structure, it is not sufficient. In the absence of complementary factors, the competition may remain latent, unrealized. Only as the business and infrastructural environment improves will markets expand and competition intensify. Employment 92 is the log of the firm's 1992 industrial employment.
Appendix: Definitions of Variables
Export 93 is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm exported at least part of its production in 1993.
HighwayDensity t is the log of the number of kilometers of paved roads per 1,000 square kilometers of area in the region in year t. Information for 1998 and 1999 is not available, so we imputed the 1997 values for them.
IndustryGrowth t is the log of the ratio of year t output of the firm's five-digit industry (using our database, not including firm i) in December 1992 prices to the previous year output of the industry in December 1992 prices.
K t is the log of the book value in 1992 prices of the enterprise's fixed assets used in industrial production. Revaluations are controlled for using beginning-and end-year book values.
L 1t is the log of the enterprise's number of production workers.
L 2t is the log of the enterprise's number of non-production employees.
Military is a dummy equal to 1 if the enterprise formerly belonged to an MIC branch ministry.
NatDisp 87 is one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared output shares of each firm in the five-digit industry) at the national level in 1987.
Non-State t is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is over 50 percent privately owned in year t.
Non-StateMills t is the inverse Mills' ratio for non-state enterprises, calculated from the first-stage probit for whether the enterprise was non-state or not in year t.
Plants 93 is the log of the number of plants the firm has in 1993.
PriceChange t is the log of the year t average producer price deflator relative to December 1992 for each four-digit industry.
PriceReg 96 is the proportion of the number of goods and services with regulated prices in the region in the first quarter of 1996.
Profit 92 is the enterprise's profits (losses) divided by output in 1992.
RailroadDensity t is the log of the number of kilometers of railroads per 10,000 square kilometers of area in the region in year t. Information for 1998 and 1999 is not available, so we imputed the 1997 values for them.
RegionalGrowth t is the log of the ratio of year t industrial output of the region (using our database, not including firm i) in December 1992 prices to the previous year output of the region in December 1992 prices.
RegDisp 87 is one minus the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (sum of squared output shares of each firm in the five-digit industry) at the regional level in 1987.
RegionalShare 87 is the proportion of regions with at least one firm in the five-digit industry in 1987.
StateMills t is the inverse Mills' ratio for state enterprises, calculated from the firststage probit for whether the enterprise was non-state or not in year t.
Subsidiary 93 is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm was either a subsidiary or parent firm in 1993.
SurvivalMills t is the inverse Mills' ratio in year t from the first-stage probit for whether the enterprise survived or not.
Telephone t is the number of telephones per household in urban areas of the region at the beginning of the year. Information for 1999 is not available, so we imputed the 1998 values for that year.
Transport is an index of the region's transport infrastructure from 0 to 1, such that the larger the number, the better the region's transport infrastructure relative to other regions. It was constructed by the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, and reported in Matiyasevich et al (1998) . We have reversed the variable (subtracting from 1), such that the larger the number, the better the region's transport infrastructure relative to other regions. The index is based on the proximity of the region to a non-freezing port, proximity to a main transportation junction, the average distance between settlements, the number of road accidents per 100,000 population in 1996, the number of big airports in 1996, the airport capacity in 1995, the railway density in 1996, the density of railways in common use in 1996, the share of railways with electric power supply measured by length, car road density in 1996, inner waterways density in 1996, and the number of large sea ports in 1996.
Y t is the log of the value of output the enterprise produced in December 1992 prices, using 4-digit producer price deflators. The means are calculated here without using logs, though some variables are logged in the regressions. 0.554 0.561 N = 77,122 in all regressions. "RE" refers to GLS estimation using random effects (at the firm and region-industry group, alternatively). T-statistics (z in the RE specifications) are reported in parentheses and in the OLS specifications are based on White-corrected robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on firm id. The omitted year category is 1993. The factors of production for 10 sectors and sectoral dummies are also included. Estimated marginal products (weighted average across the 10 sectors) are 0.386, 0.539, and 0.155 for capital, production workers, and non-production workers, respectively. Table 3 are also included, but not reported. (-2.64 ) N = 77,122. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on White-corrected robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on firm id, in the OLS specification. All other variables in the regression in Table 3 are also included. (-5.52 ) N = 77,122. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on White-corrected robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on firm id, in the OLS specification. All other variables in the regression in Table 3 are also included. (-6.27 ) N = 71,111. T-statistics, reported in parentheses, are based on White-corrected robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering on firm id, in the OLS specification. All other variables in the regression in Table 3 are also included.
